Criminal Procedure: Confessions, Searches, and Seizures by Esparza, Elena Alicia & Keasler, Honorable Michael E.
SMU Annual Texas Survey
Volume 3 Article 8
2017




Honorable Michael E. Keasler
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, michael.keasler@txcourts.gov
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smuatxs
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, and the State and
Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Annual Texas
Survey by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





Honorable Michael E. Keasler**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
II. CONFESSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
III. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
A. STANDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
1. Curtilage: State v. Rendon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
2. Third-Party Doctrine: Ford v. State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act: State v. Huse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
B. REASONABLE SUSPICION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
1. Brodnex v. State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
2. Leming v. State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
C. ATTENUATION DOCTRINE: Utah v. Streff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
D. WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
1. Search Incident to Arrest: Birchfield v. North
Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
2. Mandatory-Blood-Draw Statute: State v. Villarreal . 176
3. Exigent Circumstances: Cole v. State and Weems v.
State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
I. INTRODUCTION
A review of cases involving confessions, searches, and seizures shows
significant developments in search and seizure jurisprudence but no sig-
nificant change in confession jurisprudence. Because there have been no
significant changes in confession jurisprudence, this Survey includes a
brief snapshot into cases decided by Texas’s Courts of Appeals during the
Survey period—December 1, 2015 to November 30, 2016. The U.S. Su-
preme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals continue to de-
velop the law around warrantless blood draws and breath tests. The court
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of criminal appeals has also clarified ambiguities in the areas of standing
and reasonable suspicion.
II. CONFESSIONS
A confession must be knowing and voluntary.1 In Texas, a defendant
may challenge the voluntariness of a custodial confession under three
theories—failure to comply with Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, failure to comply with Miranda v. Arizona, and due pro-
cess violations.2 A voluntariness claim based on the defendant’s state of
mind is cognizable under Article 38.22.3 The latter two theories apply
when there is law enforcement overreach, such as an excessive length of
questioning or threats of violence.4
A defendant’s mental illness is only a factor that may determine
whether the custodial confession was involuntary based on a failure to
comply with Article 38.22.5 In Williams v. State, Williams claimed that his
confession was rendered involuntarily because it was given while he suf-
fered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).6 Because Williams ap-
peared to understand the warnings given before the confession, the First
Houston Court of Appeals held that Williams’s confession was voluntary
despite his PTSD.7 A person suffering from mental illness or substance
abuse is still capable of providing a voluntary confession if it appears he
understands the required warnings.8
A custodial confession is involuntary if coerced by violence, threats, or
improper promises.9 In Texas, a promise will render a confession involun-
tary if it is “positive, made or sanctioned by someone in authority, and of
such an influential nature that it would cause a defendant to speak un-
truthfully.”10 In Avellaneda v. State, Avellaneda argued that his confes-
sion was coerced by the officer’s promise that he would receive
leniency.11 Avellaneda’s argument failed because the record supported
the trial judge’s finding that no improper promises were made.12
Confessions or statements made when not in custody are not required
to comport with Article 38.22 or Miranda.13 A defendant is in custody if a
1. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.21 (West 2015).
2. Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
3. Id. at 171.
4. Id. at 170–71.
5. Williams v. State, 502 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet.
ref’d).
6. Id. at 271.
7. Id. at 274.
8. Id.
9. Martinez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 792, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Bram v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897)).
10. Avellaneda v. State, 496 S.W.3d 311, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016,
no pet.).
11. Id. at 315.
12. Id. at 317.
13. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 5 (West 2015).
2017] Criminal Procedure 165
reasonable person in his situation would not feel free to leave.14 Curi-
ously, in Koch v. State, the First Houston Court of Appeals held that
Koch, who was in handcuffs and placed in the back of a patrol car, was
not in custody.15 Because Koch was told he was detained, not arrested,
and was placed in the patrol car so officers could complete their investi-
gation, the court of appeals held that he was not in custody and his state-
ments were admissible.16 This case is somewhat outside the norm.
III. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects in-
dividuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.17 Although the Texas
Constitution has its own similar protections,18 the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals has, traditionally, followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s juris-
prudence in these cases.19 During the Survey period, the court of criminal
appeals wrestled with the ramifications of cell-site-location information
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
Both the Supreme Court and the court of criminal appeals continue to
refine the law around warrantless blood draws.
A. STANDING
A defendant must have standing before he can challenge a search or
seizure.20 Standing requires a person to have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, meaning (1) he has a subjective expectation of privacy in the
place or thing to be searched; and (2) his subjective expectation is objec-
tively reasonable.21 When analyzing a defendant’s reasonable expectation
of privacy, courts consider a number of factors including historical no-
tions of privacy, precautions taken to preserve privacy, the defendant’s
possessory interest, and whether the defendant has dominion or
control.22
1. Curtilage: State v. Rendon
The reasonable expectation of privacy attached to a person’s home ex-
tends to the surrounding area—the curtilage.23 Curtilage protects the
area surrounding a home, such as a porch or small yard, but it will not
protect large adjacent areas, such as fields.24 Despite the curtilage protec-
14. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324–25 (1994) (per curiam).
15. Koch v. State, 484 S.W.3d 482, 490–91 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no
pet.).
16. Id. at 491.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9.
19. Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944, 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
20. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978).
21. Richardson, 865 S.W.2d at 948–49.
22. See, e.g., State v. Batts, 397 S.W.3d 198, 203–04 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
23. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
24. See id. at 179.
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tions, police retain an implied license to enter the curtilage to knock on a
person’s door.25
When a defendant lives in a second-story apartment, a narcotics sniff at
the threshold of the defendant’s door is an unlawful search of the apart-
ment’s curtilage.26 In State v. Rendon, officers investigating Rendon
brought a drug-detecting dog to his apartment complex and conducted
canine-narcotics sniffs at his car and the threshold of his apartment.27 The
canine-narcotics sniffs detected narcotics at both locations.28 Based on
both canine-narcotics sniffs, the officers obtained a search warrant.29
At trial, Rendon filed a motion to suppress and argued that the canine-
narcotics sniff performed at his threshold was an unlawful search.30 The
trial judge granted Rendon’s motion.31 In the findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, the trial judge concluded that the landing directly in front of
Rendon’s door was curtilage, and because the canine-narcotics sniff in-
truded on the curtilage, it was an unlawful search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.32 The judge ruled that, after the results of the ca-
nine-narcotics sniff at Rendon’s threshold had been excluded, the re-
maining information did not establish probable cause and the search
warrant was invalid.33 The court of appeals affirmed.34
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, but did not reach
whether Rendon’s landing was curtilage.35 Relying on Florida v. Jardines,
the court of criminal appeals held that conducting a canine-narcotics sniff
at a defendant’s threshold or immediately outside his door was an unli-
censed physical intrusion into the home’s curtilage.36 In Jardines, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that conducting a canine-narcotics sniff on a defen-
dant’s front porch was an unlicensed physical intrusion into the home’s
curtilage.37 Under Jardines, bringing a drug-detection dog onto the curti-
lage of a defendant’s home to conduct a canine-narcotics sniff exceeds the
scope of the implied invitation to enter the curtilage.38 Similarly, in
Rendon, the court of criminal appeals held that the officers exceeded any
implied invitation when they brought a drug-detection dog to the thresh-
old of Rendon’s apartment to conduct a canine-narcotics sniff.39 Bringing
a drug-detection dog to an apartment’s threshold was an unlicensed phys-
25. State v. Rendon, 477 S.W.3d 805, 809–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
26. Id. at 806.








35. Id. at 807–08.
36. Id. at 808.
37. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013).
38. Id. at 1416 (“An invitation to engage in canine forensic investigation assuredly
does not inhere in the very act of hanging a knocker.”).
39. Rendon, 477 S.W.3d at 811.
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ical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.40
While the trial judge and court of appeals held that the landing outside
of Rendon’s apartment was curtilage, the court of criminal appeals did
not reach that issue.41 Because the court was able to resolve the opinion
by deciding that the threshold of the apartment was curtilage, whether a
landing is curtilage is still an open question.42
2. The Third-Party Doctrine: Ford v. State
Under the third-party doctrine, a defendant does not have standing to
challenge searches and seizures that are performed on third parties.43
When a defendant voluntarily discloses his information to a third party,
that information is no longer private and no reasonable expectation of
privacy exists.44 This is true even if the initial disclosure was given on the
assumption of limited use.45 Under the third party doctrine, any informa-
tion voluntarily disclosed to a third party can be obtained without a war-
rant because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.46
The advent of cell phones has added a new wrinkle to the third-party
doctrine. Cell phones operate by sending radio signals to and from cell-
phone towers.47 Whenever a cell phone is turned on, it continuously iden-
tifies its location in relation to the nearest tower.48 The cell-phone service
provider records the phone’s location every time a call or text is sent.49
This cell-site-location information is a record of that cell phone’s, and
conceivably its owner’s, approximate location.50 Prosecutors and investi-
gators can use cell-site-location information to establish a defendant’s
presence near a crime scene or to contradict a defendant’s claims.51
In Ford v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
State could obtain four days of cell-site-location information from a ser-
vice provider without a warrant.52 In that case, evidence of Ford’s cell-
site-location information was admitted by the State to corroborate wit-
ness testimony and support the timeline it advanced at trial.53 Ford chal-




43. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976).
44. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
45. Id. at 744.
46. Id. at 745–46.
47. Eric Lode, Annotation, Validity of Use of Cellular Telephone or Tower to Track
Prospective, Real Time, or Historical Position of Possessor of Phone Under Fourth Amend-





52. Ford v. State, 477 S.W.3d 321, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
53. Id. at 327.
54. Id.
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At the court of appeals, the majority, relying on the third-party doctrine,
held that obtaining four days of cell-site-location information did not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment.55 Since Ford’s cell-site-location information
was disclosed to his service provider through his cell phone use, the court
of appeals held that the information had been voluntarily disclosed.56 In
contrast, the dissenting opinion of the court of appeals argued that a per-
son has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements and loca-
tion and that simply using a cell phone is not a voluntary disclosure of
that information.57
The court of criminal appeals affirmed.58 The court of criminal appeals
held that Ford had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the informa-
tion because it was held by a third party.59 In fact, Ford never owned or
possessed the records.60 Further, Ford voluntarily used a cell-phone ser-
vice that required certain information, including his location, be sent to
and from cell towers.61 The court of criminal appeals limited its holding
to short-term cell-site-location information and noted that long-term cell-
site-location information might raise Fourth Amendment concerns.62
With the abundance of cell phones and the amount of information dis-
closed through the internet, Ford may have far-reaching consequences.
Cell-site-location information can now be seized from service providers
without a warrant. Further, information disclosed to websites or corpora-
tions to use a service or play a game may also be discoverable. The limits
of Ford are unclear at this time. For now, short-term cell-site-location
information held by a service provider is subject to seizure without a
warrant.
3. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: State v. Huse
HIPAA sets strict security and privacy standards for personally identifi-
able health care information.63 Under HIPAA, medical information is
carefully secured and disclosure is closely monitored.64 In State v. Huse,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered HIPAA’s effect on cur-
rent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.65
In Huse, officers took Huse to a hospital after he was in an accident.66
At the hospital, his “blood was drawn for medical purposes.”67 His blood-
55. Ford v. State, 444 S.W.3d 171, 192 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014), aff’d, 477
S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
56. Id. at 188–89.
57. Id. at 202–03 (Chapa, J., dissenting).
58. Ford, 477 S.W.3d at 330.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 330–31.
61. Id. at 331.
62. Id. at 334.
63. State v. Huse, 491 S.W.3d 833, 835 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, Huse v.
Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1066 (2016).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 835–36.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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alcohol concentration was .219%.68 Prosecutors filed “a grand jury sub-
poena duces tecum to obtain [Huse’s] medical records,” and the hospital
released the records.69 Huse was charged by information with driving
while intoxicated.70 Huse, arguing that the subpoena violated state law
and HIPAA, filed a motion to suppress his medical records.71 While the
motion was pending, the State dismissed the information and the grand
jury issued a second subpoena duces tecum.72 The trial judge granted
Huse’s motion to suppress on the grounds that a warrant was required
and the grand jury subpoena was misused.73
The court of appeals, relying on State v. Hardy, reversed the trial judge
and held that Huse did not have standing to pursue his Fourth Amend-
ment claim.74 In Hardy, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that
defendants have no reasonable expectation of privacy in blood-alcohol
test results when the test was taken by medical personnel for medical
purposes.75 Sensitive to the Hardy holding, the court of appeals in Huse
held that HIPAA may have broadened some privacy interests, but it did
not extend those interests to blood-alcohol-test results obtained by medi-
cal personnel for medical purposes.76 Further, the court of appeals noted
that HIPAA explicitly allows the disclosure of medical records to law en-
forcement in certain circumstances.77
The court of criminal appeals affirmed and held that because the test
was performed for legitimate medical purposes, Huse did not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the blood-alcohol-test results.78 Further,
because HIPAA specifically allowed disclosure if required by grand jury
subpoena and the first grand jury subpoena was lawful, HIPAA was not
violated.79
HIPAA’s effect on the seizure of medical records generally is unclear,
but it does not affect the holding in Hardy.80 Even under HIPAA, a de-
fendant’s blood-alcohol-test results are still subject to subpoena and
seizure if the tests are performed by medical personnel for medical
purposes.81
B. REASONABLE SUSPICION





72. Id. at 836–37.
73. Id. at 837.
74. Id. at 839.
75. State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
76. Huse, 491 S.W.3d at 839.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 843.
79. Id.
80. See Hardy, 963 S.W.2d at 527.
81. Huse, 491 S.W.3d at 842–43.
82. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968).
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temporary investigative detention need only be supported by reasonable
suspicion.83 With reasonable suspicion, an officer may perform a Terry
stop—temporarily detain and frisk a defendant.84 Reasonable suspicion
exists when, based on the totality of the circumstances, an officer has
“specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences
therefrom, lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actu-
ally is, has been, or soon will be, engaged in criminal activity.”85 During
this Survey period, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals published two
cases discussing reasonable suspicion.
1. Brodnex v. State
In Brodnex v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
time of day, location in a high-crime area, and a defendant’s status as a
“known criminal” do not support a finding of reasonable suspicion.86 In
that case, an officer saw Brodnex leave a hotel in a high-crime area at two
in the morning.87 The officer approached him, asked his name and what
he was doing, and handcuffed him.88 Although the officer did not person-
ally know Brodnex, he had been told that Brodnex was a known crimi-
nal.89 After searching Brodnex, the officer discovered a cigar tube filled
with crack cocaine.90 Brodnex was charged with possession of a con-
trolled substance.91 The trial judge denied Brodnex’s motion to suppress
the cigar tube.92
The court of appeals affirmed.93 It determined that the totality of the
circumstances created a reasonable suspicion and supported Brodnex’s
investigative detention.94 The court of appeals focused on the time of day,
the narcotic activity in the area, and the officer’s belief that Brodnex was
a known criminal.95 According to the court of appeals, although these
facts alone were not sufficient, taken together they supported a finding of
reasonable suspicion.96
The court of criminal appeals reversed and held that the time of day,
narcotic reputation of the area, and Brodnex’s status as a known criminal
did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion.97 The officer’s belief
that Brodnex was a known criminal was based on unsubstantiated ru-
83. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
84. Id.
85. Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657, 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Castro v.
State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
86. Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432, 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
87. Id. at 434.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 435.
90. Id. at 434.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 435.
93. Id. at 436.
94. Id. at 435.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 438.
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mors, and there was no evidence that the officer saw Brodnex commit
any crime.98 Reasonable suspicion requires more than a good-faith be-
lief.99 There were no specific, articulable facts that supported whether
Brodnex had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime.100 Based on the evidence available at trial, the court of criminal
appeals found that reasonable suspicion was not supported.101
2. Leming v. State
In Leming v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that fail-
ing to maintain a lane and driving slowly could support a finding of rea-
sonable suspicion of driving while intoxicated.102 In that case, an officer
responded to a report that Leming was swerving and observed Leming
swerve several times into the next lane while driving well-below the speed
limit.103 A dash cam corroborated the officer’s observations, except it was
unclear in the video whether Leming actually entered the adjacent
lane.104 The officer pulled Leming over and performed a field sobriety
test.105 He then arrested Leming for DWI.106 Arguing that the officer did
not have reasonable suspicion to support the temporary investigative de-
tention, Leming filed a motion to suppress the traffic stop.107 The trial
judge overruled the motion, and the court of appeals reversed the trial
judge.108 The court of criminal appeals, in turn, reversed the court of
appeals.109
The court of criminal appeals held that the facts supported a finding of
reasonable suspicion.110 The citizen’s report and the officer’s observa-
tions, which were supported by the dash-cam footage, both supported the
reasonable suspicion that Leming committed the offense of driving while
intoxicated.111 Driving below the speed limit and encroaching on another
lane will support an officer’s reasonable suspicion for a temporary inves-
tigative detention.112
Note that in Section II of the opinion—in which Presiding Judge Keller
and Judges Meyers and Richardson joined—Judge Yeary wrote that there
was reasonable suspicion of failing to maintain a lane, which also sup-
ported the stop.113 Judge Yeary reasoned that the officer’s observation
98. Id.
99. Id. at 437.
100. Id. at 438.
101. Id.
102. Leming v. State, 493 S.W.3d 552, 564–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
103. Id. at 554.
104. Id.




109. Id. at 565.
110. Id. at 563–64.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 565.
113. Id. at 561.
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that Leming came very close to entering an adjacent lane several times
and the report that Leming was swerving together supported the reasona-
ble suspicion that Leming failed to maintain his lane.114 Four of the nine
judges considered the above facts sufficient to support the temporary in-
vestigative detention of an individual for the traffic infraction of failing to
maintain a single lane.115
C. ATTENUATION DOCTRINE: Utah v. Strieff
A Fourth Amendment violation is generally remedied by the exclusion-
ary rule, which makes the fruits of an illegal search inadmissible.116 In
certain circumstances, however, the exclusionary rule does not apply and
the fruits of an illegal search are admissible.117 There are three recog-
nized exceptions to the exclusionary rule: the independent-source excep-
tion; the inevitable-discovery exception; and the attenuation doctrine.118
The independent-source exception applies if the evidence was acquired
separately from a different, independent, and legal search.119 The inevita-
ble-discovery exception applies when the evidence would have been dis-
covered without the Fourth Amendment violation.120 Finally, the
attenuation doctrine applies when the connection between the unconsti-
tutional act and the discovery of evidence is interrupted by intervening
circumstances and exclusion would not serve a constitutional purpose.121
The U.S. Supreme Court revisited the attenuation doctrine in Utah v.
Strieff. In Strieff, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the
discovery of a valid warrant during an unconstitutional investigative stop
was an intervening circumstance.122 The Supreme Court concluded it was
and the attenuation doctrine applied.123
In Strieff, an officer unlawfully performed a temporary investigatory
detention of Strieff.124 As a result of the unlawful detention, the officer
discovered that there was a valid arrest warrant for Strieff.125 The officer
arrested Strieff and, in a search incident to the arrest, found
methamphetamine and drug paraphenalia.126 At trial, Strieff filed a mo-
tion to suppress the methamphetamine and drug paraphenalia as fruit of
an illegal search.127 The trial judge denied this motion, and the court of
appeals affirmed.128 The Utah Supreme Court reversed because there
114. Id.
115. Id.






122. Id. at 2062.
123. Id. at 2064.
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was no voluntary act by the defendant to trigger the attenuation doc-
trine.129 The Supreme Court reversed the Utah Supreme Court.130
The Supreme Court held that a valid warrant is an intervening factor
and triggers the attenuation doctrine.131 Whether the attenuation doc-
trine applies depends on the “temporal proximity,” “presence of inter-
vening circumstances,” and “the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct.”132 In this case, the temporal proximity did not support the
application of the attenuation doctrine.133 The unlawful stop and discov-
ery of the evidence happened within a short time of each other, which
tends not to support the attenuation doctrine.134 But the presence of an
intervening circumstance supported the application of the attenuation
doctrine because the warrant was discovered before the evidence.135 Fi-
nally, there was no evidence that the officer acted in a purposeful or fla-
grant manner, so the last factor tended toward the application of the
attenuation doctrine.136 Based on these factors, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance that trig-
gered the attenuation doctrine.137 Utah v. Strieff clarified that a valid
arrest warrant acts as an intervening circumstance, triggers the attenua-
tion doctrine, and exempts discovered evidence from the exclusionary
rule.138
D. WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW AND BREATH TEST
Drunk driving is a leading cause of traffic fatalities in the United
States.139 To combat this, states around the country have enacted proac-
tive enforcement tools.140 Driving while intoxicated is generally defined
as driving with a blood alcohol content above a statutorily set percent-
age.141 A person’s blood-alcohol content is often determined through a
blood or breath test; urine analysis is also available but used less fre-
quently.142 Many states have passed mandatory-blood-draw or breath-
test statutes.143 Under these statutes, a person’s consent for a blood draw
or breath test is either implied, or the person’s refusal to consent is
criminalized.144 In this Survey period, the U.S. Supreme Court and the
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2064.
132. Id. at 2062–63.
133. Id. at 2062.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2062–63.
136. Id. at 2063.
137. Id.
138. Id.





142. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2168 n.1 (2016).
143. Id. at 2169.
144. Id.
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Texas Court of Criminal Appeals examined warrantless blood draws in
relation to searches incident to arrest, mandatory-blood-draw statutes,
and exigent circumstances.
1. Search Incident to Arrest: Birchfield v. North Dakota
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the U.S. Supreme Court examined three
cases involving warrantless blood draws and breath tests.145 All three
cases involved states that criminalized the defendant’s refusal to consent
to a blood alcohol test.146 All three defendants were informed that refus-
ing to consent to the test was a crime.147 One of the defendants, Birch-
field, refused to consent to a blood draw and was convicted of refusing to
consent.148 Another of the defendants, Bernard, refused to consent to a
breath test and was also convicted.149 The last defendant, Beylund, con-
sented to a blood draw because of the possible criminal penalties.150 The
Supreme Court considered the legality of the threatened searches on
Birchfield and Bernard, and the actual search of Beylund.151
Whether a search is a valid search incident to an arrest depends on the
individual privacy interests at stake and the governmental need for the
search.152 The Supreme Court held that breath tests and blood draws im-
plicate different privacy interests and analyzed each separately.153 The
Supreme Court held that breath tests, but not blood draws, could be per-
formed as part of a search incident to an arrest.154
The Supreme Court has made clear that breath tests do not implicate
significant individual privacy interests.155 A breath test is minimally inva-
sive—a person’s skin is not broken and the test is not as intrusive as other
procedures.156 The breath test analyzes a person’s exhalation, which is
not part of the body and would have been released eventually.157 Further,
a breath test only determines the blood alcohol content of a person’s
breath and gives no other information.158 Because the breath test is mini-
mally invasive and provides little personal information, it does not impli-
cate significant individual privacy rights.159
On the other hand, blood draws do implicate significant individual pri-
vacy interests.160 A blood draw is an invasive procedure—the person’s
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skin is punctured and their blood is removed.161 Unlike breath, which is
exhaled naturally, a person’s blood does not normally leave his body.162
Further, a blood draw can give considerably more information than blood
alcohol content, including other illicit substances present in the blood.163
Because the blood draw is invasive and can provide considerable per-
sonal information, it implicates significant individual privacy rights.164
The Supreme Court also considered the State’s need for blood draws
and breath tests.165 The States argued that these searches were necessary
to protect citizens on public roads from drunk drivers.166 The searches
not only neutralized the threat of already drunk drivers, but acted as a
deterrent for would-be drunk drivers.167 Based on the threat of drunk
drivers and the effect of these searches, the Supreme Court determined
that the searches served an important government function.168 The Su-
preme Court held that the individual privacy interests and governmental
need for the searches extends only to breath tests as searches incident to
arrest.169
In Birchfield, the States also argued that the searches were lawful
under an implied-consent theory.170 Because the Supreme Court held
that breath tests were available as searches incident to arrest, it did not
consider whether the implied-consent theory would allow for warrantless
breath tests.171 The Supreme Court did, however, consider whether war-
rantless blood draws were allowed under an implied-consent theory.172 In
Texas, this issue was decided in State v. Villarreal.173
The States in Birchfield argued that by driving on public roads all mo-
torists impliedly consent to blood draws.174 Although the Supreme Court
has approved of an implied-consent theory which imposes civil or eviden-
tiary penalties, the imposition of blood draws for criminal procedures was
a bridge too far.175 The Supreme Court held that motorists on public
roads do not impliedly consent to blood draws and the implied-consent
theory did not render the searches lawful.176
Birchfield v. North Dakota clarified that breath tests, but not blood
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that although the implied-consent theory can impose civil or evidentiary
consequences, it cannot impose criminal liability or require blood draws.
2. Mandatory-Blood-Draw Statute: State v. Villarreal
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also considered implied consent
in State v. Villarreal.177 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v.
McNeely—holding that the natural dissipation of alcohol in a person’s
blood stream did not qualify as exigent circumstances and did not, with-
out more, allow for a warrantless blood draw—left the validity of the
Texas Transportation Code’s mandatory-blood-draw statutes in ques-
tion.178 Under the mandatory-blood-draw statutes, individuals who oper-
ate motor vehicles in public places give their implied consent to give a
sample of their blood or breath.179 An officer is required to take such a
sample if the individual refuses to consent to give a sample and certain
criteria are met.180 If the statutory criteria are met, the statutes ostensibly
permit a warrantless blood draw.181
In Villarreal, an officer took a blood sample from Villarreal after he
refused to consent.182 Under the mandatory-blood-draw statutes, the of-
ficer was required to take a specimen from Villarreal because he had
been convicted of several offenses of driving while intoxicated.183 At trial,
Villarreal moved to suppress the evidence by arguing that the mandatory-
blood-draw statutes conflicted with McNeely and were unconstitu-
tional.184 The State argued that McNeely was limited to exigent circum-
stances and the mandatory-blood-draw statutes were based on implied
consent and unaffected by McNeely.185 The trial court granted Villarreal’s
motion to suppress and held that the mandatory-blood-draw statutes
were unconstitutional.186 The court of appeals affirmed, but did not hold
that the mandatory-blood-draw statutes were unconstitutional.187
Affirming the court of appeals, the court of criminal appeals held that
the mandatory-blood-draw statutes did not dispense with the warrant re-
quirements.188 The court of criminal appeals held that a warrantless
blood draw must fit within a recognized warrant exception.189 The follow-
ing warrant exceptions were considered in this case: (1) the consent ex-
ception; (2) the automobile exception; (3) the special-needs exception;
and (4) the search-incident-to-arrest exception.190
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The court of criminal appeals first addressed the State’s implied-con-
sent argument.191 The State argued that when an individual drives on
public roads he impliedly consents to give a sample of his blood and
waives his Fourth Amendment rights.192 The court of criminal appeals
disagreed.193 First, the court of criminal appeals noted that consent can
be revoked at any time and the State’s argument makes consent irrevoca-
ble after Villarreal began to drive.194 Consent that cannot later be re-
voked or limited is not voluntary consent.195 The court of criminal
appeals then noted that the implied-consent theory had been rejected in a
number of Texas courts of appeals and other states.196 The court of crimi-
nal appeals held that Texas drivers do not impliedly consent to searches
by using public roads.197 This holding is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s subsequently delivered Birchfield v. North Dakota opinion.
Second, the court of criminal appeals rejected the State’s argument that
the search was valid under the automobile exception.198 The automobile
exception is limited to vehicle searches.199 The court of criminal appeals
refused to extend the exception to cover the search of a person.200 War-
rantless blood draws cannot be justified under the automobile
exception.201
Third, the court of criminal appeals rejected the special-needs excep-
tion.202 The special-needs exception allows warrantless searches if there
are “special needs beyond normal law enforcement.”203 This exception
requires that it be impractical to obtain a warrant.204 The court of crimi-
nal appeals did not find any basis to support a special-needs exception in
Villarreal because the case’s facts did not extend beyond normal circum-
stances and it was not impractical to obtain a warrant.205
Finally, the court of criminal appeals rejected the argument that the
warrantless blood draw qualified as a search incident to arrest.206 Al-
though the result is the same as in Birchfield, the court of criminal ap-
peals’ reasoning was distinct. The court of criminal appeals rejected this
exception for three reasons.207 First, the search was not performed con-
temporaneously with the arrest.208 Second, the search was not of an area
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within Villarreal’s control.209 Third, there was neither a danger to the of-
ficer nor the evidence.210 For these reasons, the court of criminal appeals
determined that the search-incident-to-arrest exception was
unwarranted.211
Although the court of criminal appeals affirmed the court of appeals, it
did not expressly reach the constitutionality of the mandatory-blood-
draw statutes.212 Because the court of criminal appeals held that warrants
were required in the mandatory-blood-draw statutes, it was not necessary
to reach whether the statutes were constitutional.213
3. Exigent Circumstances: Cole v. State and Weems v. State
Under State v. Villarreal, a warrantless blood draw is unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls into one of the well-recog-
nized exceptions to the warrant requirement, like the exigent-circum-
stances exception.214 The exigent-circumstances exception applies when
the character of a situation makes the law enforcement’s needs compel-
ling and provides no time to obtain a warrant.215 In Missouri v. McNeely,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the natural dissipation of a substance in
the human body is not an exigent circumstance.216 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals recently examined the exigent-circumstances exception
in light of McNeely and Villarreal.
In Cole v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the
circumstances surrounding the warrantless blood draw were sufficiently
exigent.217 There, Cole caused a serious accident in a major intersec-
tion.218 Fourteen officers were required to secure the scene and redirect
traffic.219 The accident investigation took three hours and had to be com-
pleted before the accident was cleared.220 The accident was finally
cleared seven and a half hours after it occurred.221 While officers were
securing the scene and investigating the accident, Cole was evaluated by
emergency medical services and taken to the hospital by his detaining
officer.222 Cole told the detaining officer that he had taken
methamphetamine, and his behavior was consistent with having taken
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warrantless blood draw.224 The blood-test results showed that the defen-
dant’s blood had “intoxicating levels of amphetamine and
methamphetamine.”225
At trial, Cole filed a motion to suppress the blood-test results.226 At a
hearing on the motion, the lead accident investigator testified that he was
the only one who could perform the investigation and that he could not
leave the scene to obtain the warrant.227 Fourteen officers were required
at the scene and the detaining officers could not abandon Cole, none of
these officers were available to obtain a warrant.228 The warrant process
would take at least an hour, and “it was not feasible to wait until the
accident investigation was entirely complete[d]” to obtain a warrant.229
There was also a danger of medical intervention affecting the blood-test
results.230 The trial judge held that exigent circumstances existed outside
of the natural dissipation and the warrantless blood draw was lawful and
consistent with McNeely.231 The court of appeals reversed the trial judge,
holding that exigent circumstances did not exist because there was
neither an attempt to secure a warrant nor an indication that no officers
were available to secure a warrant.232
On discretionary review, however, the court of criminal appeals held
that exigent circumstances existed.233 The practical problems of obtaining
a warrant created the exigency.234 First, the lead accident investigator’s
three-hour investigation of the accident scene was a major obstacle in
obtaining a warrant.235 Second, because the accident occurred in a major
intersection and involved substantial debris, fourteen officers were re-
quired to secure the scene and direct traffic.236 Third, the lead accident
investigator could not leave the scene to obtain a warrant before the in-
vestigation was complete.237 Fourth, medical intervention may have al-
tered the blood-draw results.238 Finally, there is not a known elimination
rate for methamphetamine, which means officers would have no way to
work backwards and determine the original concentration in the blood.239
The court of criminal appeals held that the totality of the circumstances
supported the exigent-circumstances exception and the warrantless blood
draw did not violate the Fourth Amendment.240
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On the other hand, in Weems v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals held that there were no exigent circumstances.241 Weems caused a
single-car accident and attempted to evade the police.242 He was found
and arrested by police forty minutes later.243 Weems was then taken to
the hospital where an officer filed mandatory-blood-draw paperwork.244
Two hours later, Weems’s blood was drawn without his consent and with-
out a warrant.245 The blood-test results showed he had a blood alcohol
content of .18.246 Weems filed a motion to suppress the blood-test re-
sults.247 The trial judge denied this motion.248 The court of appeals, how-
ever, reversed the trial judge.249
The court of criminal appeals affirmed the court of appeals and held
that the State did not establish the exigent-circumstances exception.250 As
the court of criminal appeals discussed in Cole, the exigent-circumstances
exception is only applicable when an objective examination of the totality
of the circumstances shows that there is a compelling need for the search
and no time to secure a warrant.251 The U.S. Supreme Court made clear
in McNeely that the natural dissipation of alcohol in a person’s blood
stream is not, on its own, a sufficiently exigent circumstance.252 But, as
seen in Cole, a warrantless blood draw can be justified under the exigent-
circumstances exception if the other circumstances surrounding the blood
draw are sufficiently exigent.253
In Weems, the court of criminal appeals found that Weems’s attempted
evasion, which lasted less than an hour, was evidence of exigency.254 Al-
though there was a two-hour delay at the hospital to obtain the blood
draw, there was no evidence that the officer was aware of the delay when
he arrived at the hospital and filed the mandatory-blood-draw
paperwork.255 As the court of criminal appeals made clear, considering
this delay in the exigency analysis without evidence that the officer was
aware of the delay “would impermissibly measure [the officer’s] action
against hindsight’s omniscience.”256 However, because there was evi-
dence that the delay was at least foreseeable, the two-hour delay was
considered.257
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The evidence of delays alone does not present sufficient exigent cir-
cumstances, and evidence of practical problems in obtaining a timely war-
rant is also required.258 Although the State presented evidence of routine
warrant procedure, there was no evidence of what the warrant procedure
is when a suspect is taken directly to a hospital.259 The State also did not
present evidence on whether the officer could have obtained a warrant or
how long the warrant process would have taken.260 Further, the officer’s
testimony suggested that a magistrate was available to issue a warrant if
requested and that another officer was available to assist in obtaining a
warrant.261 Without evidence of practical problems that hinder an of-
ficer’s ability to obtain a warrant, the evidence of a delay on its own did
not establish sufficient exigency, and the court of criminal appeals held
that there were no exigent circumstances.262
IV. CONCLUSION
During the Survey period, the most significant changes came in the law
surrounding warrantless blood draws and breath tests. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. Supreme Court grap-
pled with implied consent and exigent circumstances. Both courts also
distinguished and clarified the law regarding standing, reasonable suspi-
cion, and attenuation. There were no significant developments in confes-
sion law, and the Supreme Court and court of criminal appeals continue
to rely on Miranda and its progeny.
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